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73 
COMMENTS 
Intending to Confuse: Why Preponderance Is the Proper 
Burden of Proof for Intentional Trademark Infringements 
Under the Lanham Act* 
To protect trade-marks . . . is to protect the public from deceit, to 
foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community 
the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their 
diversion from those who have created them to those who have 
not.1 
[A] reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and 
creator, and another can use it only as a mask.2  
-Judge Learned Hand 
I. Introduction 
Though not as domineering as it is in the realm of patents or copyright, 
federal law still plays a significant role with respect to trademarks—the 
most prominent promulgation coming in the form of the Lanham Act of 
1946 (Lanham Act).3 The Lanham Act provides for the national protection 
of trademarks, the importance of which was noted in Congress’s statement 
in connection with the Act’s adoption. There, Congress observed that its 
“[n]ational protection of trademarks” would serve the valuable purposes of 
fostering competition and ensuring quality “by securing to the producer the 
benefits of a good reputation.”4  
Aside from the Act’s primary goal of facilitating commerce, it aims to 
“protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing 
producers.”5 Consumers are often quick to develop brand loyalty, leading to 
                                                                                                                 
 * I would like to thank Professor Megan Shaner for her incredibly helpful comments, 
edits, and insight.  I would also like to thank the Oklahoma Law Review Editorial Board for 
helping shape this piece into what it is today. 
 1. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946). 
 2. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1141n (2012)). 
 4. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). 
 5. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 6 (2012). “Two goals of trademark 
law are reflected in the federal scheme. On the one hand, the law seeks to protect consumers 
who have formed particular associations with a mark. On the other hand, trademark law 
seeks to protect the investment in a mark made by the owner.” Avery Dennison Corp. v. 
Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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subsequent purchases of the products for which they develop a sense of 
quality and satisfaction. If consumers could not ascertain whose product is 
whose, the use of copies and reproductions would become more prevalent, 
and the faith that purchasers had developed in a certain manufacturer would 
be diminished when the copycats failed to meet the original manufacturer’s 
standards. Moreover, when a consumer buys a product with the false belief 
that it is the trademark owner’s product and the mistakenly purchased 
product is of a lesser quality, that lower level of quality will likely be 
attributed to the trademark owner himself.6 This may result not only in the 
consumer abandoning the brand altogether, but also in the consumer 
spreading word of her misguided belief. This culminates in other potential 
buyers refraining from purchasing that brand as well.  
The Lanham Act offers a potential remedy to combat these problems: a 
cause of action.7 Claims arise in many shapes, sizes, and combinations 
under the Lanham Act, including claims for trademark and trade dress 
infringement, as well as false advertising, unfair competition, and trade 
dilution.8 Relief under the Act is available in both monetary and equitable 
form.9  
Potential infringers (and thus defendants) under the Lanham Act exist in 
many forms as well, including manufacturers, suppliers, dealers, printers, 
and advertisers.10 This is so because the Lanham Act allows a cause of 
action against any person who “has used the infringing mark in connection 
with ‘the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising of any goods or 
services’ when such use is likely to cause confusion.”11 
Oftentimes, a large part of a Lanham Act claim centers around whether 
the defendant intentionally infringed on the plaintiff’s mark.12 A finding of 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 3:10 (4th ed. 2012); see also El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, 
Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1986) (“One of the most valuable and important protections 
afforded by the Lanham Act is the right to control the quality of the goods manufactured and 
sold under the holder’s trademark.”). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125; see also 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 78 
(2012). 
 8. See PATRICK J. FLINN, HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS AND 
REMEDIES § 8.02 (2012). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (injunctive relief); 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (monetary relief). 
 10. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 25:26.  
 11. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)). 
 12. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “intentional” as “[d]one with the aim of carrying 
out the act.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 883 (9th ed. 2009). “Willful” is defined as 
“[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious.” Id. at 1737. Lastly, a “willful 
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intent can have significant consequences for the parties, as evidenced in the 
landmark case of adidas America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc.13 In this 
case, the jury awarded adidas roughly $305 million for multiple federal and 
state law claims, including claims for trademark infringement and unfair 
competition under the Lanham Act.14  
In 2007, adidas brought suit against Payless Shoesource, claiming that 
Payless willfully infringed adidas’s rights in its “Three-Stripe trademark” 
and “Superstar Trade Dress.”15 For over fifty years, adidas had used the 
“Three-Stripe Mark” and “promoted itself as ‘[t]he Brand With Three 
Stripes.’”16 Payless began selling shoes not with three stripes, but rather 
with two stripes and four stripes in a design very similar to those of 
adidas.17  
In its discussion of the defendant’s intent, the court noted that Payless 
employees would frequently refer to the shoes either by the corresponding 
adidas model or oftentimes just as the “‘adidas’ shoes.”18 In addition, the 
purchasers of the Payless shoes repeatedly called the shoes adidas “knock-
offs.”19 Although the district court subsequently found this nine-figure 
award to be excessive and therefore reduced it, the jury had determined that 
Payless’s violations were willful based on the evidence that Payless 
knowingly imitated adidas’s “Three-Stripe Mark.”20 Thus, this case 
illustrates how important it may be to the fact finder whether a defendant’s 
use of the mark was willful. 
Whether the infringement was committed willfully or intentionally is an 
element that appears in many sections throughout the Lanham Act;21 yet, 
                                                                                                                 
infringement” is defined as “[a]n intentional and deliberate infringement of another person’s 
intellectual property.” Id. at 852. Therefore, throughout this Comment “intentionally” and 
“willfully” are used synonymously. 
 13. No. CV 01-1655-KI, 2008 WL 4279812 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2008). 
 14. Id. at *1, *11. Out of this $305 million award, nearly $137 million was attributable 
to the Lanham Act claims, with the punitive damages portion of the award resulting from the 
state law claims. Id. at *13.   
 15. adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1222 (D. Or. 
2007). 
 16. Id. at 1223. 
 17. Id. at 1224. 
 18. Id. at 1239. 
 19. Id.  
 20. adidas America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., No. CV 01-1655-KI, 2008 WL 
4279812, at *1, *13 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2008). After trial, Payless filed four motions for a new 
trial and/or judgment as a matter of law, each of which the district court rejected, contingent 
upon adidas’ acceptance of a remittitur. Id. at *1.  
 21. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B), (d)(1)(A). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
76 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:73 
 
 
courts are split with respect to what should be the proper burden of proof 
for these willful violations.22 Some circuits, including the First and Fourth 
Circuits, have applied the preponderance of the evidence standard when 
looking to the defendant’s intent.23 Other circuits—such as the Third and 
Fifth Circuits—have applied the clear and convincing evidence standard.24  
The number of Lanham Act elements that require a finding of intent 
further highlights the need for establishing a clear rule with respect to the 
proper standard of proof to show that intent. This Comment addresses the 
current lack of clarity regarding what the proper standard of proof should be 
when looking at an infringer’s intent under a Lanham Act claim.  
This Comment surveys the varying standards for evaluating intent under 
the Lanham Act to conclude that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard best serves the policies of the Act. Part II provides a brief 
background of trademark law and the Lanham Act, discussing its important 
aspects, which have fostered its evolution into the grandfather of federal 
trademark law. Part III delves into four major areas of Lanham Act claims 
that involve proof of the defendant’s intent. Discussion of these four areas 
not only exposes the prevalence of intent within the Act, but also stresses 
the need for uniformity for treatment of intent throughout the Act. Part III 
also presents a principal case illustrating how the courts have dealt with the 
burden of proof in each of the four areas. Part IV then discusses the 
diverging standards courts have used in addressing a defendant’s intent, 
ultimately asserting that preponderance of the evidence is the proper 
standard for intentional trademark violations under the Lanham Act. Part V 
then concludes this Comment. 
II. Background 
A. Defining and Classifying a “Trademark” 
“A trademark is a word, name, symbol, device, or any combination 
thereof,” which serves to classify and distinguish goods or services.25 A 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 193 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 23. E.g., id.; Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 227 (4th Cir. 
2002). 
 24. E.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated 
on other grounds by TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); 
Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 25. Jonathan B. Schwartz, Comment, Less Is More: Why a Preponderance Standard 
Should Be Enough for Trademark Abandonment, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1345, 1348 (2009); 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
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distinctive sound may also qualify for trademark protection, a classic 
example being the “roar” of the MGM lion.26 Courts have also granted 
protection to the ornamental aspects of a uniform, a popular case in point 
being the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders’ uniform.27 Within the last twenty 
years, the Supreme Court has even gone so far as to recognize that a single 
color of a good is capable of trademark protection.28 Justice Breyer, writing 
for the Court, posited, “If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can act as 
symbols why, one might ask, can a color not do the same?”29  
 Trademarks also protect distinctive packaging and the overall 
appearance of a good, traditionally deemed “trade dress.”30 Historically, 
Congress limited the protection of trade dress to just the packaging and 
labeling that created the overall appearance of a product.31 Over time, 
however, trade dress has expanded to a broader definition and now includes 
“a combination of any elements in which a product or service is presented 
to the buyer.”32 The semantic distinction between “trademarks” and “trade 
dress” is largely an archaic one; today both are generally lumped together 
under the trademark law umbrella and both represent potential Lanham Act 
infringement claims.33  
Although the scope of this area of law has expanded from its origination, 
even today not all trademarks are treated equally. Instead, trademarks fall 
on a spectrum based on their distinctiveness.34 “The term ‘distinctive’ is a 
key term of art in trademark law. . . . If a designation is not ‘distinctive,’ it 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See MARK S. LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2:27 
(2012). 
 27. See id. § 2:29 (2012); see also Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat 
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 1979); NFL Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls 
Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 664 (W.D. Wash. 1982). 
 28. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7:44; Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 
U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (“[T]rademark law would protect Qualitex’s use of the green-gold 
color on its press pads.”). 
 29. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 162. 
 30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (1995) (“Thus, if 
another seller markets a product incorporating a protected packaging or product feature in a 
manner that is likely to cause confusion as to the source of the product, the seller is subject 
to liability for trademark infringement.”). 
 31. See id.; MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 8:1. 
 32. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 8:1. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. § 11:2; DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: TRADEMARK 
LITIGATION TACTICS AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES TO PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND 
PREVENT COUNTERFEITING 5 (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/TMLitigation 
Report_final_2011April27.pdf. 
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is not a ‘mark.’”35 To qualify as a candidate for trademark protection, the 
mark must either: (1) be inherently distinctive or (2) acquire its 
distinctiveness through a secondary meaning.36  
Trademark law designates inherently distinctive marks as those that are 
fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive.37 These types are immediately 
protectable.38 The benefit of having an immediately protectable mark is that 
the owner does not need to prove consumer recognition to receive judicial 
protection.39 Examples of inherently distinctive marks include Apple 
computers, Godiva chocolates, and Clorox bleach.40 When a trademark is 
not initially inherently distinctive, it can still become so by acquiring a 
secondary meaning.41 This secondary meaning is interpreted as “a mental 
association in buyers’ minds between the alleged mark and a single source 
of the product.”42 Examples of marks that have become distinctive through 
a secondary meaning include Beetle for Volkswagen and Coke for Coca-
Cola.43  
The bottom line with “distinctiveness” in trademark law is that the more 
distinctive a trademark is, “the greater the scope of protection the mark will 
receive in court against users of the same or similar marks.”44 Strong 
protection means protection covering a wide spectrum of related products, 
including visual and aural format variations.45 Thus, the more distinctive 
                                                                                                                 
 35. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 11:2. 
 36. Id.; see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).  
 37. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 11:4; see also DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 34, 
at 5. To further elaborate on the classifications of inherently distinctive marks, definitions 
from McCarthy provide assistance. “A fanciful mark is a word that is coined for the express 
purpose of functioning as a trademark.” MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 11:4. “An arbitrary 
mark consists of a word or symbol that is in common usage in the language, but is arbitrarily 
applied to the goods or services in question in such a way that it is not descriptive or 
suggestive.” Id. A suggestive mark is “a mark which merely suggested some quality or 
ingredient of goods.” Id. § 11:62. 
 38. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 11:4. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:28 (2012) 
[hereinafter UNFAIR COMPETITION]. 
 41. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 15:1.  
 42. Id. § 15:5. 
 43. See 3 LEWIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 20:29 (4th ed. 2012); see also Volkswagenwerk, AG v. 
Smith, 471 F. Supp. 385 (D.N.M. 1979); Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 254 U.S. 
143 (1920), superseded by statute, Lanham Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427. 
 44. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 34, at 5. 
 45. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 11:73. 
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the mark is, the more likely that using a similar mark will generate 
confusion.46 The justification behind giving strong, inherently distinctive 
marks greater legal protection is that the more fame and marketing strength 
a mark gains, the broader the scope of protection it deserves.47  
B. The History and Evolution of the Purpose of Trademarks 
The desire to protect trademarks dates back to medieval England, when 
local guilds required manufactured goods to be distinctively marked.48 
Initially, the usage of trademarks was to indicate the origin and maker of 
the goods, serving primarily a regulatory function.49 This compulsory 
production mark not only allowed faulty products to be traced to their 
maker, who would then be punished, but also aided in the confiscation of 
foreign goods that were smuggled into the region.50  
Eventually, with the vast expansion of markets, a new purpose for 
trademarks arose.51 Instead of merely existing for regulatory reasons, 
trademarks began to represent manufacturer identity, which meant that 
potential buyers had more options and could select based on reputation.52 
Soon, manufacturers viewed the use of their mark as a valuable advertising 
mechanism.53 This identity theory behind the importance of trademarks 
continues to thrive today, both socially and economically.54 After all, 
“[i]dentity of product is essential to the creation and development of a 
market, and the trademark is the means to this end.”55 
The goal behind trademark usage has evolved drastically from the 
medieval days, with a trademark no longer just serving as a mere symbol of 
good will.56 Modernly, a trademark is “often the most effective agent for 
the creation of good will, imprinting upon the public mind an anonymous 
and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995). 
 49. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813, 814 (1927). 
 50. Id. 
 51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. b (1995). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Daphne Leeds, Trademarks from the Government Viewpoint, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 
489, 489 (1956). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Schechter, supra note 49, at 818. 
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satisfactions.”57 Broad recognition exists that trademarks have evolved to 
serve dual goals. They not only protect consumers from deception, but they 
also safeguard the trademark owner’s rights to his mark and the goodwill 
associated therewith.58  
C. Federal Protection for Trademarks 
While the desire for trademark protection dates back to medieval times, 
federal statutory protection of trademarks did not emerge until the early 
twentieth century. Common law dominated the province of trademark law 
for hundreds of years.59 Congress did not pass the first modern federal 
trademark statute until 1905.60 Even then, the Trademark Act of 1905 
proved to be very limited in scope, allowing only “arbitrary and fanciful 
trademarks” to be registered and offering weak enforcement for the 
registered marks.61 It was not long before the need for more expansive 
protection became evident through persistent pressure on the legislature.62  
In 1920, Congress amended the Trademark Act of 1905, extending the 
ambit of registration and establishing the predecessor to section 43(a) 
claims under the Lanham Act, which provides a claim for false designations 
of origin among other acts constituting unfair competition.63 The “false 
designation of origin” provision in the 1920 amendment, however, required 
that the infringer’s violation occur “willfully and with intent to deceive.”64 
The legislature further amended and altered the Trademark Act of 1905, 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 819 (emphasis added). 
 58. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:2. 
 59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. e (1995). 
 60. Id. (citing Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724). The first federal trademark 
statute was actually enacted in 1870, but nine years later was held to be unconstitutional. Id. 
(citing The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)). In 1881, a second federal statute was 
passed, but registration of a mark was limited to use in commerce with foreign nations and 
Indian tribes. Id. Therefore, the Trademark Act of 1905 is typically viewed as the first 
modern federal trademark statute. Id. 
 61. Sondra Levine, The Origins of the Lanham Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 22, 
23 (2010); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:3. 
 62. Thomalyn Epps, Trademark Law: How We Got to Where We Are Today, 19 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 5 (2010) (“[This] limited scope invited continuing pressure for 
Congress to provide increased and expanded protection.”). 
 63. Margreth Barrett, Finding Trademark Use: The Historical Foundation for Limiting 
Infringement Liability to Uses “In the Manner of a Mark,” 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893, 
935-36 (2008). Although discussed much more in-depth in this comment, as an introductory 
matter, section 43(a) claims include claims for false designation of origin. Id. at 942. 
 64. Id. at 936. 
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ultimately resulting in a tangled web of statutory arrangements leaving 
federal trademark law in dire need of clarity.65 
In response to the shortcomings of the Trademark Act of 1905, Edward 
S. Rogers, a well-known Chicago attorney who specialized in trade identity 
law, drafted the Lanham Act.66 Among other things, the Act aimed “to 
simplify trade-mark practice, to secure trade-mark owners in the good will 
they have built up, and to protect the public from imposition by the use of 
counterfeit and imitation marks and false trade descriptions.”67  
Fritz G. Lanham, a Texas state congressman and businessman for whom 
the bill was named, heard of the draft by Rogers after dealing with a lack of 
protection for his own trademarks, as well as the trademarks of others.68 In 
1937, Rogers traveled to Washington to present his blueprint of the 
trademark statute to Congressman Lanham.69 The draft impressed Lanham 
very much, leading him to introduce it to Congress in 1938.70 Although 
World War II temporarily overshadowed the draft’s introduction to 
Congress, eight years later the draft became the Lanham Trademark Act of 
1946.71  
Since its initial adoption, Congress has frequently amended the Lanham 
Act, most substantially in 1989.72 Though each particular amendment may 
have had a distinct goal, the result has been consistent: “an effective 
expansion of the Act to meet changing societal needs” in global 
commerce.73 
Congressional desire to have federal laws regulating trademarks is even 
specified in section 45 of the Act, which in pertinent part provides:  
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the 
control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and 
misleading use of marks in such commerce; . . . to protect 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 937. 
 66. Beverly W. Pattishall, The Lanham Trademark Act at Fifty — Some History and 
Comment, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 442, 442 (1996). 
 67. Daphne Robert, Commentary on the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 
373, 375 (1996). 
 68. Pattishall, supra note 66, at 442. 
 69. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:4. 
 70. Pattishall, supra note 66, at 442. 
 71. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:4. 
 72. Anne Hiaring, Basic Principles of Trademark Law, in UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK 
LAW, at 27, 29 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook 
Series G-904 2007). 
 73. H. Peter Nesvold & Lisa M. Pollard, Foreword, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 49, 51 (1996).  
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persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; 
[and] to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the 
use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations 
of registered marks . . . .74  
Though state law offers some trademark protection, the broad scope of the 
Lanham Act powerfully safeguards trademarks owners’ rights at the federal 
level.  
D. Lanham Act Claims 
The two primary sections that provide causes of action under the Lanham 
Act are section 32 and section 43(a), which are codified as 15 U.S.C. § 
1114 and 15 U.S.C. § 1125, respectively.75 Section 32 offers protection for 
those with registered trademarks; specifically, it provides: 
 (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the 
registrant— 
 (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or 
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or 
 (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a 
registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, 
or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, 
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in 
commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in 
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive, 
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies 
hereinafter provided.76  
Section 32 essentially allows a registered trademark owner to bring 
action against a defendant who uses a mark in commerce that is a 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                 
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
 75. Hiaring, supra note 72, at 53. 
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
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mark and is likely to cause confusion. Section 32 also covers those who 
actually affix the mark to goods (i.e., the manufacturers). 
Section 43(a) allows for much broader protection than section 32, 
protecting not only registered trademarks, but unregistered ones as well. 
Section 43(a) also encompasses what trademark law generally refers to as 
“unfair competition.”77 Section 43(a) states: 
 (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or 
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any 
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, 
which—  
 (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities 
by another person, or 
 (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or 
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that 
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.78 
One key difference in section 43(a) is that it allows “‘any person who 
believes that he or she is or is likely to be, damaged’ by the defendant’s 
infringing acts” to bring a claim, whereas only the registrant may bring a 
claim under section 32.79 
Two types of claims that generally fall under section 43(a) are claims for 
both “palming off” and “reverse palming off” (also referred to as “passing 
off” or “reverse passing off,” respectively).80 In a typical “palming off” 
situation, defendant X sells his goods with the mark of the owner, Y.81 With 
“reverse palming off,” defendant X sells Y’s goods with defendant X’s 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See FLINN, supra note 8, § 8.02. 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
 79. Danny Chase, Attacking the Section 32(1) Claim, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 363, 
368 (2010). 
 80. See UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 40, § 1:1. 
 81. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 25:4. Both “palming off” and “reverse palming off” 
can be broken down into an “express” form and an “implied” form. Id. §§ 25:5-25:8. 
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trademark.82 While these two claims represent classic instances where the 
defendant intends to confuse consumers, both fall under the broader 
umbrella of unfair competition.83   
In sum, federal trademark law commonly treats section 32 as the general 
trademark infringement statute and section 43(a) as the statute for federal 
unfair competition.84 Claims brought under these provisions of the Lanham 
Act are not mutually exclusive. Rather, it is common for section 32 and 
section 43(a) claims to be brought together because their remedies are 
essentially the same.85  
The Lanham Act has not been without revisions, however. In 1996, 
Congress added section 43(c) of the Lanham Act to cope with the 
expansion of trademark law.86 This new section, officially dubbed the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (Dilution Act),87 provides a federal 
claim for trademark dilution.88 Trademark dilution occurs when a famous 
mark is: (1) “tarnished,” meaning that the use of a mark creates negative 
associations with the trademark owner’s famous mark, or (2) “blurred,” 
meaning that the famous mark has less capacity to distinguish or identify its 
goods.89  
                                                                                                                 
 82. See id. § 25:4. 
 83. See id. § 25:1. 
 84. See M. Elaine Buccieri, Cause of Action for Trademark Infringement Under the 
Lanham Act, in 10 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 501, § 3 (1998). 
 85. Id. Generally speaking, remedies under the Lanham Act include injunctive relief, as 
well as the recovery of money damages and attorney’s fees. Id. § 45.  
 86. See FLINN, supra note 8, § 8.02. 
 87. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 106 Stat. 3568. 
 88. FLINN, supra note 8, § 8.02. The original statutory language of section 43(c) did not 
explicitly set the standard for dilution, but rather stated that the mark must “cause dilution.” 
See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 436 n. 1 (2003). After the Supreme 
Court held in Moseley that section 43(c) required proof of actual dilution, Congress amended 
section 43(c), effective as of October 6, 2006, to set the standard as “likely to cause 
dilution,” reversing the Court’s holding. See ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 43, § 22:18. 
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, titled the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, now states: 
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is 
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to 
an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark 
has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that 
is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous 
mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of 
competition, or of actual economic injury. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012). 
 89. FLINN, supra note 8, § 8.02. 
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With trademark dilution claims, there is no need to show likelihood of 
confusion or deception, which distinguishes these claims from other 
trademark infringement claims.90 Rather, the famous trademark owner has 
the burden of proving that the defendant’s use was likely to cause dilution.91 
In such claims, the famous trademark owner is typically only entitled to 
injunctive relief and the defendant’s intent does not need to be proven. 
However, there is one major caveat. Monetary damages may be awarded to 
the famous trademark owner if the claim is: (1) for dilution by blurring and 
the defendant “willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the famous 
mark,” or (2) for dilution by tarnishment and the defendant “willfully 
intended to harm the reputation of the famous mark.”92  
Finally, in 1999, Congress added section 43(d) of the Lanham Act to 
include a new cyberpiracy provision, known officially as the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.93 The legislature enacted this 
amendment to combat the problems with the expansion of trademark 
infringement due to commerce on the Internet.94 Courts coined the phrase 
“cybersquatting” after defendants began registering domain names on the 
Internet that were “identical to or confusingly similar” to a distinctive or 
famous trademark with the “‘bad faith intent to profit’ from the mark.”95 
On a broad level, the law may view trademark dilution claims and 
anticybersquatting claims under the Lanham Act as types of “trademark 
infringements.”96 But these two claims are more appropriately treated 
separately due to their more narrow substantive coverage and unique 
standards for establishing violations.  
In order to prevail on a Lanham Act trademark infringement claim, the 
plaintiff must show that: “(1) the plaintiff has a protectable ownership 
interest in the mark, and (2) the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to 
cause consumer confusion.”97 “Likelihood of confusion” occurs when the 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id.  
 91. See ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 43, § 22:25. 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B) (emphasis added).  
 93. 1 CHARLES E. MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG III, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION: 
LANHAM ACT 43(A) § 3:38 (2012). 
 94. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999). 
 95. Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d), 177 A.L.R. FED. 1 
(2002) (quoting § 1125(d)). 
 96. See FLINN, supra note 8, § 8.02. 
 97. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 78 (2012); see also Tana v. 
Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2010); Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 
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infringer’s use of a mark is so similar to that of the owner’s mark that 
consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods or 
services.98 A plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant intended to 
confuse consumers as to the source of a good.99 However, proving the 
defendant’s intent is not only a key factor in the likelihood of confusion 
test, but also in the plaintiff recovering amounts based on an accounting of 
the infringer’s profits as well as attorney’s fees.100 It is in the realm of the 
defendant’s intent where the circuits have split, particularly as to what the 
proper burden of proof should be: some courts select the preponderance of 
the evidence standard, while other courts choose the clear and convincing 
evidence standard.101 Thus, an in-depth look into the infringer’s intent 
under Lanham Act claims is necessary. 
III. The Infringer’s Intent 
When a defendant intentionally uses a mark so similar to the plaintiff’s 
trademark that it is likely to cause confusion, the defendant is attempting to 
get a free ride off of the plaintiff’s goodwill or reputation, which is largely 
what the Lanham Act was enacted to prevent.102 Though finding that a 
defendant used a mark intentionally to cause confusion does not 
automatically result in liability under Lanham Act infringement claims,103 it 
is still a crucial factor in the likelihood of confusion test on which liability 
could ultimately hinge.  
                                                                                                                 
608 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2010); Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 
2006); Anderson v. Upper Keys Bus. Grp., Inc., 61 So. 3d 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 98. MCKENNEY & LONG, supra note 93, § 2. 
 99. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:107. 
 100. See id. § 23:110; see also James M. Koelemay, Jr., A Practical Guide to Monetary 
Relief in Trademark Infringement Cases, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 263, 269, 300 (1995). 
 101. See supra notes 23-24.  
 102. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333 (1946); MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:110 (“If there is 
proof of defendant’s intent and purpose to trade on another’s good will by using a similar 
mark to cause confusion, then the court will follow the alleged infringer’s judgment and find 
a likelihood of confusion.”). It is important to keep in mind that this anti-free-riding 
principle should be limited to the goodwill of the trademark or brand itself, as opposed to the 
type of good or product. Free riding on the demand created for a particular class of goods is 
not only economically desirable; it also does not elicit the same moral concern as that 
associated with free riding on a particular trademark. Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion 
out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark 
Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1356 (2012). 
 103. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:107. 
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As a foundational matter, it is important to consider what evaluating the 
defendant’s intent means. To phrase differently: Exactly what outcome did 
the defendant need to intend? Modernly, the only intent of the defendant 
that is relevant is “intent to confuse.”104 Although the likelihood of 
confusion standard is a multifactor test, in some circuits, evidence of intent 
to confuse creates a presumption of likelihood of confusion.105 This 
reasoning is premised on a belief that if the defendant purposely used a 
mark similar to that of the plaintiff with the expectation of creating 
customer confusion and gaining profits, then the court will presume that he 
succeeded.106  
Yet other courts, such as the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, go further, 
allowing the intent to copy to create a presumption of intent to confuse.107 
In turn, this creates a presumption of likelihood of confusion.108 Intent to 
copy is broader than intent to confuse, however, because it can occur in 
circumstances where the copier was not aiming to benefit from the 
trademark owner’s goodwill.109 By allowing intent to copy to create a 
presumption of intent to confuse, the courts must pile inference upon 
inference. This is dangerous because mere “copying” is not always 
impermissible.110 For instance, the law does not prohibit the copying of 
generic or functional words and shapes in the public domain, but rather 
encourages it as a part of our competitive economic system.111  
Instead of allowing intent to copy to result in a presumption of likelihood 
of confusion, a court would be wiser to focus solely on the defendant’s 
intent to confuse, which is the majority view.112 This would better serve the 
purposes of the Lanham Act and safeguard innocent conduct from 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See id. § 23:110 (4th ed. 2012). 
 105. See id. § 23:111 (4th ed. 2012); see also Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks 
Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 317 (1st Cir. 2002); Res. Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-
Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 106. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:110. 
 107. See, e.g., Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1172 (11th Cir. 1991); Ferrari 
S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobile E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1243 (6th Cir. 
1991). 
 108. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:111; Bone, supra note 102, at 1337.  
 109. See ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 43, § 21:84. For example, the copier may have 
believed in good faith that her use of the mark fell under the defense of “fair use.” Id.  
 110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22 (1995); MCCARTHY, supra 
note 5, § 23:122; Bone, supra note 102, at 1337-38. 
 111. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:122. 
 112. As evidenced by the courts’ varying uses of presumptions, this is an issue open to 
disagreement and a more in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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triggering liability. Therefore, reference to the defendant’s intent 
throughout this Comment focuses on the appropriate and modern 
interpretation of intent to confuse. 
Although the courts have not been shy to discuss the defendant’s intent, 
what the proper burden of proof should be with respect to that intent has 
arisen in four areas under the Lanham Act. Some circuits choose clear and 
convincing evidence as the proper standard; others deem preponderance of 
the evidence to be the proper standard. The following four principal cases 
will present the circuit split and help bring to light the dominant arguments 
for both the preponderance of the evidence standard and the clear and 
convincing evidence standard. 
A. Weighing the Infringer’s Intent Under the “Likelihood of Confusion” 
Standard: Versa Products 
When a plaintiff brings a section 32 or 43(a) claim under the Lanham 
Act, the test employed is whether there was a “likelihood of confusion.”113 
This asks whether the defendant’s use of the mark was likely to cause 
confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive consumers as to the source of the 
goods or services.114  
1. Circuit Application of the Likelihood of Confusion Test 
When looking to see whether “likelihood of confusion” is present, the 
courts examine a variety of factors.115 The factors used by a single court are 
not dispositive—rather each court selects its own set and number of 
factors.116 For example, the Eighth Circuit has employed six factors to 
consider in determining whether a “likelihood of confusion” exists:  
(1) the strength of the owner’s mark; (2) the similarity of the 
owner’s mark and the alleged infringer’s mark; (3) the degree of 
competition between the products; (4) the alleged infringer’s 
intent to “pass off” its goods as the trademark owner’s; (5) 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:1. 
 114. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992); see also 
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:1. 
 115. Id. § 23:19. 
 116. Id. For an in-depth analysis of the variety of factors courts use in their “likelihood of 
confusion” test, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for 
Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006). 
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incidents of actual confusion; and, (6) the type of product, its 
cost, and conditions of purchase.117 
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit takes a different approach, examining 
eight factors, which are the: 
(1) strength of the senior mark; (2) relatedness of the goods or 
services; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual 
confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely degree of 
purchaser care; (7) the intent of defendant in selecting the mark; 
and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.118 
Lastly, the Restatement on Unfair Competition follows eight foundational 
factors in determining “likelihood of confusion,” summarized as follows: 
(1) [t]he degree of resemblance between the conflicting 
designations; (2) [t]he similarity of the marketing methods and 
channels of distribution; (3) [t]he characteristics of the 
prospective purchasers and the degree of care they exercise; (4) 
[t]he degree of distinctiveness of the senior user’s mark; (5) 
[w]here the goods or services are not competitive, the likelihood 
that prospective buyers would expect the senior user to expand 
into the field of the junior user; (6) [w]here the goods or services 
are sold in different territories, the extent to which the senior 
user’s designation is known in the junior user’s territory; (7) 
[t]he intent of the junior user; and (8) [e]vidence of actual 
confusion.119 
In each of these approaches, the defendant’s intent plays a critical role in 
determining whether she is liable for trademark infringement. “As 
likelihood of confusion is the touchstone of infringement, a finding of 
intentional use of another’s registered mark increases the chance that the 
use will be found infringing.”120 
Recently, much scholarly debate has arisen over the workability of the 
“likelihood of confusion” test, particularly due to the inconsistency of the 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 118. Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 
280 (6th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). 
 119. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:19 (emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 20-23 (1995)). 
 120. Buccieri, supra note 84, § 26. 
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test’s application among the circuits.121 Much of this disagreement centers 
largely on the role of the defendant’s intent itself, further highlighting the 
need for clarity in this realm.122 
But although the test may be in a state of imprecision, the courts still 
agree that “likelihood of confusion” is the proper test for establishing 
trademark infringement liability.123 And while the standard for trademark 
infringement is settled, the courts split on the issue of the proper burden of 
proof with regard to the defendant’s intent in these trademark violations.124 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Versa Products Co. v. Bifold Co. 
(Manufacturing) provides an example of how one court handled the 
issue.125   
2. Standard of Proof for Likelihood of Confusion: Versa Products 
Versa Products, a manufacturer of control valves used in the offshore oil 
industry, alleged that Bifold was producing valves with configurations 
similar to those produced by Versa.126 As a result, Versa brought a trade 
dress infringement claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, along with 
state statutory and common law unfair competition claims.127 After Bifold 
appealed the district court’s finding of likelihood of confusion, the Third 
Circuit evaluated ten different factors that it had previously used in a 
trademark infringement case, including “the intent of the defendant in 
adopting the mark.”128  
When discussing the defendant’s intent and the corresponding burden of 
proof, the court focused on a desire to “harmonize [product configuration 
cases] with the federal patent laws.”129 In its analysis, the court concentrated 
on how, in many patent infringement cases, the plaintiff must prove the 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See Bone, supra note 102, at 1308. 
 122. See, e.g., id. at 1307. In his article, Professor Bone argues that in cases of intentional 
deception, the element of intent should be removed entirely from the “likelihood of 
confusion” test and instead should be the sole basis for infringement liability. Id. at 1351-52; 
see also Blake Tierney, Missing the Mark: The Misplaced Reliance on Intent in Modern 
Trademark Law, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 229 (2011). Taking a starkly different approach, 
Mr. Tierney’s article argues that the courts should no longer rely on the defendant’s intent in 
their “likelihood of confusion” assessment. Id. at 261.  
 123. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 (1995); ALTMAN & 
POLLACK, supra note 43, § 21:1; MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:1. 
 124. See Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 193 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 125. 50 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 126. Id. at 193. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 205. 
 129. Id. at 207. 
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defendant’s willful infringement by clear and convincing evidence, placing 
emphasis on the desire to not restrict competition.130 Although the Third 
Circuit recognized the inherent differences and policies involved with 
trademark and trade dress cases on the one hand and patent cases on the 
other, the court nonetheless turned to patent infringement cases as 
justification to apply that burden of proof to the defendant’s intent.131  
The Versa Products court thus held that “a defendant’s intent weighs in 
favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion only if intent to confuse or 
deceive is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.”132 The court 
made no mention of any trademark cases under the Lanham Act addressing 
the burden of proof suitable to the defendant’s intent, clearly indicating that 
the issue had yet to be developed. 
B. Considering the Infringer’s Bad Faith Intent to Profit Under the 
“Cyberpiracy Provision”: Harrods  
Evaluation of the defendant’s intent may also occur under the Lanham 
Act’s new cyberpiracy provision. This provision, formally titled the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (Anticybersquatting Act), is 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).133 Claims involving trademark cyberpiracy 
are a much more specific form of trademark infringement and prohibit a 
different form of conduct than what normally occurs in trademark 
infringement claims. With cyberpiracy, the infringer registers an Internet 
domain name that is similar or identical to an existing trademark, but 
without intent to actually use the name in commerce.134 Instead, the 
infringer seeks to sell the domain name to the company associated with that 
highly valued trademark.135 The Anticybersquatting Act requires that the 
plaintiff’s mark be either distinctive or famous, and the defendant’s domain 
name must be “identical or confusingly similar to that mark.”136 
Because the defendant need not use the domain name in commerce, 
intent to confuse is not the appropriate intent to evaluate. Instead, the 
Anticybersquatting Act makes clear that the infringer must have “a bad 
faith intent to profit from that mark.”137 To assist the courts in determining 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 208. 
 133. MCKENNEY & LONG, supra note 93, § 3:38. 
 134. H.R. REP. 106-412, at 6 (1999). 
 135. Id. 
 136. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 137. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). 
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whether “bad faith intent to profit” was present, the Anticybersquatting Act 
includes a section presenting nine nonexclusive factors for courts to 
consider.138 
Although causes of action under the Anticybersquatting Act were 
plentiful, both the courts and statute were silent on the proper burden of 
proof with respect to this “bad faith intent” until the Fourth Circuit case of 
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names.139 In Harrods, Harrods UK 
brought an action under the Anticybersquatting Act against sixty Internet 
domain names registered by Harrods Buenos Aires, a corporate entity no 
longer affiliated with Harrods UK, alleging that these domain names had 
been registered in “bad faith,” as required under the Lanham Act.140  
At trial, the district court held that preponderance of the evidence was the 
proper standard.141 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed, noting that “[w]e 
can find no other cases discussing the proper standard of proof under the 
[Anticybersquatting Act], so we are the first to take a direct crack at the 
question.”142  
The Fourth Circuit explained that it would presume the preponderance of 
the evidence standard would apply “in civil actions between private 
litigants unless ‘particularly important individual interests or rights are at 
stake.’”143 The court stated that the interests to be protected under the 
Anticybersquatting Act did not rise to the level of the limited list of 
interests for which a clear and convincing standard had been applied.  
The court did, however, note that the clear and convincing standard had 
occasionally been used in cases where fraud was alleged.144 Subsequently, 
the court recognized other civil cases involving fraud where the 
preponderance of the evidence standard was used, concluding that it could 
“see no clear, overarching principle that separates the fraud or bad faith 
claims requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence from those fraud 
or bad faith claims requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”145 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that if Congress had intended a 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B). 
 139. 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002). For an in-depth look at the Harrods case, see Kevin 
Afghani, Note, Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names: A Nonexpansive Expansion of 
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act?, 5 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 141 
(2003). 
 140. Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 219. 
 141. Id. at 225. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 226 (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 227. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/2
2014]       COMMENTS 93 
 
 
heightened standard to apply, it would have explicitly listed that 
standard.146 Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed that preponderance of the 
evidence was the correct standard for registrations made with “bad faith 
intent” under the Anticybersquatting Act.147  
Here, the Fourth Circuit was the first to tackle the issue of the proper 
burden of proof for the defendant’s intent under the Anticybersquatting Act. 
Addressing many of the factors that the Third Circuit discussed in Versa 
Products, the Fourth Circuit diverged by using the preponderance of the 
evidence standard to evaluate intent. Although it is true that the Third 
Circuit was adjudicating a trade dress claim and the Fourth Circuit was 
analyzing an anticybersquatting claim, both were section 43 Lanham Act 
claims. Until the plaintiff’s burden of proof for intent under Lanham Act 
claims is well established, the courts will continue to turn to areas of law 
that are only slightly related to trademark law. 
C. Willful Infringements Allow a Recovery of Accounting of Infringer’s 
Profits: Fishman Transducers 
Once the court finds that a Lanham Act violation occurred, the remedies 
for that infringement are clearly enumerated in the Lanham Act. Under 15 
U.S.C. § 1117(a), a plaintiff is entitled to recover, among other things, the 
defendant’s profits resulting from the infringement.148 The initial 
justification for providing the plaintiff with a recovery of the defendant’s 
profits was merely to provide the trademark owner with compensation for 
the economic loss stemming from the infringement on his mark.149 
Subsequently, another widely accepted rationale developed: the prevention 
of unjust enrichment.150  
1. Circuit Split on Willful Infringement Requirement 
In connection with awarding an accounting of the infringer’s profits, 
there is a circuit split as to whether a plaintiff must prove “willful 
infringement” to permit recovery of an accounting of profits. The vast 
majority of courts require a showing of the defendant’s intent.151 The 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). This provision for the recovery of violation of rights 
applies to section 32 claims, section 43(a) claims, willful Dilution Act claims, and 
Anticybersquatting Act claims. Id. 
 149. See Koelemay, supra note 100, at 277. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. at 267-68; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 30:62. 
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Second Circuit, for example, has held that “[i]n order to recover an 
accounting of an infringer’s profits, a plaintiff must prove that the infringer 
acted in bad faith.”152 The Tenth Circuit has followed suit, requiring “a 
showing that Defendant’s actions were willful to support an award of 
profits under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).”153 Along with other circuits that have 
considered the issue, including the Sixth and Ninth, the modern 
Restatement on Unfair Competition takes the view that a plaintiff must 
establish a willful infringement to receive this type of award.154 
Although the majority of circuits require a showing of willfulness, the 
proper burden of proof for such a showing is much less settled. The First 
Circuit recently dealt with the issue in Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 
where it explicitly recognized the circuit split with regard to the defendant’s 
intent.155  
2. Proper Evidentiary Standard for Willful Infringement: Fishman 
Transducers 
In this case, Fishman sued HSN Interactive, musician Stephen Paul, and 
his company Daystar Productions for trademark infringement and false 
advertising under the Lanham Act.156 The action arose after HSN sold 
guitars falsely claiming they included Fishman pickups.157  
At trial, testimony was excluded with respect to damages resulting from 
the infringement, thus “Fishman’s remaining hope was to recover the 
defendant’s profits, but this required a showing of willfulness.”158 The 
judge’s instructions to the jury required the plaintiff to prove willfulness by 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 
753 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 153. W. Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 427 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th 
Cir. 2005). 
 154. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 (1995); Koelemay, supra 
note 100, at 269. 
 155. 684 F.3d 187, 193 (1st Cir. 2012). The First Circuit’s illustration of the circuit split 
was a comparison of the Versa Products case with the Harrod’s case—a clear demonstration 
that the burden of proof for willful infringements is one that is often a matter of first 
impression. Id. at 193 n.7. 
 156. Id. at 189. HSN Interactive LLC is a retailer of various consumer goods and 
products whose sister company sells goods on the Home Shopping Network. Id.  
 157. Id. A guitar pickup is a transducer that converts the vibration of the strings of an 
electric guitar into a signal that can be amplified, usually through a speaker. Marshall Brain, 
How Electric Guitars Work, HOW STUFF WORKS (July 1, 2002), http://entertainment.how 
stuffworks.com/electric-guitar1.htm. 
 158. Id. at 191. 
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clear and convincing evidence.159 Though the jury found violations for both 
trademark infringement and false advertising, they found neither to be 
willful.160 This finding of no willfulness was likely due to HSN presenting 
evidence that the guitar manufacturer had erroneously informed HSN that 
the guitars included the Fishman pickups and HSN ceased claiming that the 
guitars included the Fishman pickups when notified of the mistake.161  
When addressing the issue of the proper burden of proof regarding the 
defendant’s intent on appeal, the First Circuit brought up the fraud 
argument used frequently to support the clear and convincing standard.162 
But it ultimately dismissed that argument, pointing to fraud-related cases 
that had applied the preponderance of the evidence standard instead.163 
Further, the Fishman court reasoned that the Lanham Act itself did not call 
for a heightened standard, ultimately holding that the trial court’s jury 
instruction was incorrect.164 The court concluded by holding that 
preponderance is the proper standard for this matter of first impression in 
the First Circuit.165  
The recentness of the Fishman Transducers case reiterates that setting 
the proper burden of proof for the defendant’s intent under Lanham Act 
claims (and relief thereunder) is an area where the courts simply have little 
guidance. As a result, the courts are turning to semi-related case law and 
claims dealing with fraud. 
D. Determining Exceptional Cases for Awarding Attorney Fees: Pebble 
Beach 
Aside from allowing a plaintiff to recover an accounting of the 
infringer’s profits and other damages, the Lanham Act also permits the 
court to award the plaintiff the costs of the action.166 However, Congress 
has clarified that this award is to be given only in “exceptional cases.”167 
Although the statute fails to define “exceptional,” the legislative history of 
the Lanham Act provides some assistance. The Senate Report classifies 
exceptional cases as “infringement cases where the acts of infringement can 
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be characterized as ‘malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful.’”168 
By including the classifications of “deliberate,” or “willful,” the legislature 
implied that cases where the defendant acted intentionally to cause 
confusion would satisfy this definition.  
Furthermore, the Senate Report highlights the “particularly compelling 
need for attorney fees” for trademark and unfair competition claims brought 
under the Lanham Act.169 This need centers around the constantly 
expanding business of manufacturing and advertising that makes 
“trademarks of crucial importance to manufacturers, distributors and the 
consuming public.”170 Although evolution in commerce is certainly 
beneficial, modern business practices make much more salient the 
opportunities for competitors to intentionally cause confusion and get a free 
ride off the plaintiff’s goodwill. Therefore, an award of attorney fees is 
justified in these circumstances.171 
The only circuit court to address the issue of the burden of proof with 
respect to these “exceptional cases” is the Fifth Circuit, most recently in 
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd.172 In that case, Pebble Beach brought 
action against Tour 18 for service-mark and trade-dress infringement, unfair 
competition, and false advertising under the Lanham Act.173 Pebble Beach 
brought these section 32 and section 43(a) claims against the Tour 18 golf 
course in Humble, Texas, after Tour 18 copied the fourteenth hole from one 
of the several golf courses that Pebble Beach operates in the California 
area, among other actions.174 In fact, the Tour 18 golf course in Texas 
consists of replicas of golf holes from famous golf courses around the 
country, marketing itself as “America’s Greatest 18 Holes.”175  
In addition to seeking an accounting of profits, Pebble Beach also asked 
for recovery of attorney fees.176 When the Fifth Circuit turned to the 
discussion of these fees, the burden of proof for these “exceptional cases” 
was determined to be clear and convincing evidence.177 Giving little 
                                                                                                                 
 168. S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2 (1974). 
 169. Id. at 5. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by TrafFix Devices, Inc. 
v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 
30:100. 
 173. Pebble Beach Co., 155 F.3d at 535. 
 174. Id. at 533. 
 175. Id. at 534-35. 
 176. Id. at 536. 
 177. Id. at 555. 
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justification for its decision to use the clear and convincing standard, the 
circuit court cited its prior decision in CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, 
Inc., another trade-dress infringement case that adopted the clear and 
convincing standard from patent law.178  
Once again, an appellate court revealed the lack of clarity for setting the 
proper burden of proof for intentional infringement. A look at four areas 
under the Lanham Act where proof of this intent may be necessary 
highlights the circuit split over the proper standard for that proof.  
E. Four Areas, Same Intent 
Proving this intent is crucial not only because of its importance in the 
“likelihood of confusion” test, but also because of its necessity in 
cyberpiracy claims under the Lanham Act. When a plaintiff can establish 
that a defendant intentionally used a mark so similar to that of the plaintiff’s 
that consumers were likely to be confused, courts may then recuperate a 
plaintiff with an accounting of the infringer’s profits and potentially an 
award of attorney fees.  
Litigation is expensive, yet a plaintiff filing a Lanham Act claim is not 
provided the stability of knowing which burden of proof he must meet if he 
does choose to pursue legal recourse. Determining the proper burden of 
proof is often an issue of first impression for courts, which has led courts to 
attempt to analogize trademark law with other areas of law despite little 
relation. The Third and Fifth Circuits both selected the clear and convincing 
evidence standard as the burden of proof for the defendants’ intent, 
focusing on this standard’s frequent use in cases dealing with fraud and 
patent infringement.179 The First and Fourth Circuits took the opposite 
approach by using the preponderance of the evidence standard, reasoning 
that preponderance serves as the typical standard for civil suits and 
rehashing the Supreme Court’s reluctance to resort to a heightened 
burden.180  
Although proof of an intentional infringement is not always necessary 
for the success of a section 32 or section 43(a) claim under the Lanham Act, 
the prevalence with which a showing of the defendant’s intent is required 
not only demonstrates its importance, but the issue has created circuit 
disagreement regarding how to weigh that intent. Thus, a concrete statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id. (citing CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 979 F.2d 60, 65 (5th Cir. 
1992)). 
 179. See supra note 24. 
 180. See supra note 23. 
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provision laying out the proper burden would solve this current uncertainty 
in the law. 
IV. Preponderance Is the Proper Burden of Proof 
Though defining the burden of proof with precision is not always an easy 
task, the importance of setting the burden of proof should not be forgotten. 
In the oft-quoted words of Chief Justice Burger, “[A]dopting a ‘standard of 
proof is more than an empty semantic exercise.’”181 The burden of proof 
alone can often determine the outcome of the case. 
 As the principal cases above illustrate, the courts have muddied the 
already murky waters with the lack of uniformity for the proper burden of 
proof with respect to intentionality. Fortunately, the arguments that courts 
have utilized for each—the preponderance of the evidence standard and the 
clear and convincing evidence standard—are fairly consistent. The 
arguments for a preponderance of the evidence standard, however, are 
much stronger, and they are only strengthened by both public policy and the 
goals of the Lanham Act. 
A. In Civil Litigation Preponderance of the Evidence Is the “Default 
Setting” 
It is well settled that most civil suits employ the preponderance of the 
evidence standard; this standard could thus be described as the “default 
setting.”182 With this as the default setting, in limited instances, some 
compelling interests may justify a court raising the bar for this evidentiary 
burden. “Because the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard results in a 
roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants, we presume 
that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants 
unless ‘particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.’”183  
The Supreme Court has found that standard satisfied, and therefore 
heightened from the default to the clear and convincing evidence standard, 
in suits involving the termination of parental rights,184 deportation 
proceedings,185 and involuntary commitment litigation.186 Albeit protecting 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 
F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). 
 182. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983). 
 183. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Herman & MacLean, 459 
U.S. at 389-90). 
 184. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982). 
 185. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966). 
 186. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/2
2014]       COMMENTS 99 
 
 
a defendant in a trademark infringement case is a legitimate interest, 
especially with the desire to foster competition in the marketplace, it 
certainly does not rise to the same level of importance as having parental 
rights terminated, being removed from the country, or being committed 
against one’s will for mental illness. Furthermore, these instances where the 
court has applied a higher burden of proof involve particularly important 
individual interests, whereas protecting a defendant in a Lanham Act claim 
does not. 
For example, in Addington v. Texas, the Court held that the “clear and 
convincing” standard was required to commit an individual involuntarily to 
a state mental hospital for due process reasons.187 The Court recognized that 
“[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk 
of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater 
than any possible harm to the state.”188 In the context of actions under the 
Lanham Act, the harm is not one that is weighed expressly against the state; 
rather it is two competitors in the marketplace whose interests are weighed 
against one another.189 Neither of these interests carries substantially more 
weight and gravity when compared to the other. Thus, using the 
preponderance standard not only makes sense, but also is justified because 
of the essentially equal allocation of risk for which this standard provides.  
Likewise, in Santosky v. Kramer, the Court imposed the “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard in a case of parental termination rights, 
noting that the possibility of erroneous termination and the possibility of 
erroneous failure to terminate are not interests that should be weighed 
equally.190 The Court highlighted the strong interest in the preservation of a 
family.191 When we turn to the interest of the defendant in a Lanham Act 
claim, however, the possibility of erroneously finding that a defendant’s 
infringement was willful simply does not rise to the same level of 
significance as the possibility of an erroneous termination of parental rights. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the defendant’s intent is just one 
factor in a Lanham Act claim that will be evaluated in the totality of the 
circumstances.192 This lowers the significance of an erroneous finding in the 
Lanham Act context even more.  
                                                                                                                 
 187. Id. at 431. 
 188. Id. at 427. 
 189. Of course, the outcome of this litigation may have societal effects, but this is true of 
almost all types of litigation, and these effects are residual. 
 190. 455 U.S. 745, 765 (1982). 
 191. Id. at 766-67. 
 192. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 23:19. 
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By raising the burden of proof, “society can protect one party from an 
erroneous judgment, but only at the expense of placing an increased risk on 
the other.”193 Where litigation involves the termination of parental rights, 
deportation, and involuntary commitment, this expense is justified because 
the outcome results in little, if any, harm to the state. In contrast, in the 
context of trademark infringements under the Lanham Act, society has very 
little legitimate interest in protecting an alleged infringer, especially by 
placing an increased risk on the trademark owner, who the Act itself strives 
to protect. 
A defendant’s interest under Lanham Act claims is considerable—
especially given the possibility that he may have committed no trademark 
infringement at all. Though exposure to litigation itself may result in 
unfortunate economic losses, economic interests are not personal rights for 
which the Supreme Court has chosen to offer more protection.194 The 
plaintiff, a competitor in commerce, has interests similar, if not identical, to 
those of the defendant. Both parties may have substantial monetary interests 
riding on the outcome, but the outcome of trademark infringement disputes 
between private parties is one for which society’s concern is minimal. 
Furthermore, these monetary disputes between private parties are the 
quintessential civil suits for which the preponderance standard was 
developed.195  
 In cases weighing one competitor’s interests against another’s, the 
reasons for deviating in risk allocation simply do not exist like they do in 
cases where significant individual interests are stacked up against the state. 
Raising the evidentiary burden from the “default setting” in trademark 
infringement litigation is thus neither warranted nor justified.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 193. Robert A. Wainger, Brief Note, Santosky v. Kramer: Clear and Convincing 
Evidence in Actions to Terminate Parental Rights, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 369, 373 (1982). 
 194. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983). In Herman & 
MacLean, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need only prove his case by a 
preponderance of the evidence when seeking recovery under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 in connection with alleged fraud. Id. at 390-91. In reaching this decision, the Court 
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B. The Justification for Using a Heightened Burden of Proof in Cases of 
Fraud Is Not Applicable in the Lanham Act Context 
One field where some courts have chosen to adopt the clear and 
convincing evidence standard is in cases involving fraud.196 Cases involving 
intent to defraud under the Internal Revenue Code, for example, have called 
for this standard.197 Yet, other cases concerning fraud have used the typical 
preponderance of the evidence standard, as identified in Grogan v. Garner, 
where a defrauded creditor was required to prove his claim under the 
Bankruptcy Code by “preponderance of the evidence.”198  
This illustrates that the courts will not consistently choose the clear and 
convincing evidence standard as the burden of proof for fraud-related 
claims. Therefore, trying to analyze what the proper burden of proof should 
be for intentional trademark violations by comparing them to modern fraud-
related claims is difficult. Instead, proper analysis requires a return to the 
historical justification for applying the heightened burden in these instances 
to determine its relevance (or lack thereof) to claims under the Lanham Act.  
The use of this heightened burden in cases of fraud can be traced back to 
the courts of equity and the fear that claims were potentially fabricated.199 
This reasoning for using the clear and convincing standard also centered on 
the notion that “a successful action has the potential of tarnishing the 
defendant’s reputation of honesty and fair dealing.”200  
What the courts using this fraud argument in support of the clear and 
convincing evidence standard have disregarded, though, is whose reputation 
this heightened burden was used to protect—the defendant’s.201 In an 
infringement claim brought by a trademark owner under the Lanham Act, it 
is the plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill that the court is striving to 
protect.202 This is an important distinction because using a heightened 
burden based on an analogy to cases involving fraud directly contradicts the 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Id. at 424. 
 197. See Grossman v. Comm’r, 182 F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 198. 498 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1991). 
 199. Note, Appellate Review in the Federal Courts of Findings Requiring More Than a 
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courts’ concern with securing the hard work and goodwill of the trademark 
owner.  
Furthermore, the common law concern with fabricated claims does not 
carry as much weight when the legislature implements statutes.203 When 
Congress unequivocally spells out the elements of a claim, courts should 
have no legitimate fear of a plaintiff contriving a cause of action.204 
Moreover, because proving the defendant’s intent is just one element in 
succeeding in a claim, this fear of fabrication is greatly reduced, and the 
heightened burden thus cannot be rationalized in the Lanham Act context. 
In Grogan v. Garner, a case involving non-dischargeability of debts for 
fraud under the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
congressional intent with respect to fraud is one that can be applied in the 
trademark context.205 There, the Grogan Court found it “unlikely that 
Congress . . . would have favored the interest in giving perpetrators of fraud 
a fresh start over the interest in protecting victims of fraud.”206 Likewise, in 
the context of the Lanham Act, Congress made clear its goal of protecting a 
trademark owner’s hard-earned goodwill. With this goal laid out, it is 
unlikely that Congress wanted to favor those who intentionally take 
advantage of the plaintiff’s branding success by raising the burden of proof 
to clear and convincing evidence. 
C. Patent Law and Trademark Law Serve Substantially Different Purposes 
On top of the fraud argument made by some courts to support the clear 
and convincing standard, courts occasionally reach out to other semi-related 
types of law, such as patent, as a justification for their use for this standard. 
Some, such as the Third Circuit in Versa Products, have expressed a desire 
to harmonize federal patent and trademark laws.207 Although both patents 
and trademarks fall under the realm of “intellectual property,” there are 
crucial and fundamental differences between the two.208 Because of their 
differing objectives, federal power to regulate these two types of 
intellectual property does not even come from the same constitutional 
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provision.209 Nevertheless, some courts have seen fit to promote uniformity 
between the two areas of law. 
For example, in In re Seagate Technology, LLC, a very well-known 
patent infringement case, the court held that the patentee must prove a 
willful infringement by clear and convincing evidence.210 Though the issue 
is one that courts have not addressed frequently, other cases have also held 
that this willful infringement must indeed be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence in the patent law context.211  
Although it is debatable whether courts should administer the clear and 
convincing evidence standard in the patent infringement context in the first 
place,212 the significantly different purpose of trademarks even further 
undermines transfer of the heightened standard to trademark law. One of the 
leading treatises on trademark law clearly laid out these key distinctions:  
Patent law deals with the concept of functional and design 
inventions, in order to encourage investment in new technology 
and invention.  
 But trademark law is not concerned with the content of words 
or the development of new technology, but rather with the 
protection of identifying symbols. Unlike patent law, the purpose 
of trademark and trade dress law is to prevent customer 
confusion and protect the value of identifying symbols, not to 
encourage invention by providing a period of exclusive rights.213  
Even the Third Circuit made note that trademark cases and patent cases 
involve different considerations before expressing its desire to unify 
trademark law with federal patent law.214  
                                                                                                                 
 209. See id. § 6:2. Congress’s power to regulate patents derives from its grant of power to 
“promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress’s power over trademarks, on the other hand, is grounded in the 
Commerce Clause. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 6:5 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
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for using the clear and convincing evidence standard for willful infringements. 
 211. See, e.g., Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992); 
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Another pivotal distinction between patent law and trademark law exists 
in the requirements for a willful infringement in patent cases. As held in 
Seagate, the standard for willfulness in patent cases is objective; thus, 
“[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective 
inquiry.”215 In trademark litigation however, in circumstances where a 
finding of willfulness is necessary, the test is subjective.216 The defendant’s 
infringement must “imply some connotation of ‘intent,’ or a knowing act 
denoting an intent, to infringe or reap the harvest of another’s mark and 
advertising.”217 This major difference between willful infringements in 
patent litigation and trademark litigation illustrates how the courts should 
not immediately apply the burden of proof from patent law in cases 
involving trademark violations just because both areas of law fall under the 
broad realm of intellectual property. 
It is also important to recognize that, unlike patents, trademarks are not 
monopolistic grants.218 Trademark registration does not confer an 
underlying right to exclude like that present in patent registration.219 Rather, 
“[a] trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to 
protect the owner’s good will against the sale of another’s product as 
his.”220  
It is certainly understandable that a court would want to invoke 
uniformity in two areas of law that possess similarities; however, their 
distinctly different functions—one dealing with inventive activity and the 
other with commercial activity—do not implicate such uniformity.221 The 
argument regarding the inconsistent functions of these two areas is further 
strengthened when recognizing what is required for a willful infringement 
in each. The test under patent infringements is objective, whereas 
subjectivity plays a large role in trademark law. 
The decision of courts hearing patent infringement cases to use the clear 
and convincing evidence standard for willful infringements should not 
result in an automatic transference of this burden to the trademark law 
context. Trademark law is better served by using a burden of proof that 
furthers its own purposes, rather than borrowing from its cousin, patent law, 
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just because they both derive from the same intellectual property family 
tree. 
D. Public Policy Strongly Supports Using “Preponderance of the 
Evidence” 
1. Looking at the Goals Behind the Lanham Act 
The laws centering on trademark infringement were largely implemented 
with a desire to foster commercial morality in the marketplace.222 
Historically, these notions of equity and fairness have carried much weight 
in trademark law. In 1869, state courts recognized that in the “promotion of 
honesty and fair dealing . . . no one has a right to sell his own goods as the 
goods of another.”223  
In allowing the heightened burden of proof in these instances, it is 
important to remember whose interests would be furthered: the alleged 
infringers’. If a defendant in good faith did not intend to confuse 
consumers, the burden of proof with respect to his intent would be of little 
relevance because evidence pointing to the contrary should be nonexistent. 
Keeping the focus of the Lanham Act in mind, namely to prevent deception 
of customers, it is also crucial to recognize what an intentional infringement 
really is: the defendant trying “to get a free ride on [the] plaintiff’s 
reputation by confusing customers.”224  
Providing more protection to the party who is trying to take advantage of 
a successful plaintiff’s goodwill by making it more difficult for the plaintiff 
to prove this fact, cuts strongly against the purpose of the Lanham Act. This 
heightened burden on the plaintiff results in a greater chance that a 
defendant will not be held liable, and thus could create a chilling effect on 
desirable behavior of trademark owners striving to improve their goods.225  
Trademark laws provide a safeguard to manufacturers, incentivizing 
them to make a high quality product. When one’s trademark is exploited 
through unauthorized use, “the trademark owner is deprived of the benefits 
of her efforts and investments, as reflected in her product reputation.”226 As 
the law affords sellers less protection for their trademarks, it becomes much 
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more inhibiting for goodwill and reputation to be established. The result is a 
decreased incentive for sellers to invest in improving the quality of their 
products.227 Yet, trademarks are imperative in a competitive marketplace 
because they “secure to the business community the advantages of 
reputation and goodwill by preventing their diversion from those who have 
created them to those who have not.”228 Because proof of the defendant’s 
intent is highly prevalent in Lanham Act claims and leans strongly in favor 
of satisfying the “likelihood of confusion” test, use of the preponderance of 
the evidence standard better squares with the end goals of the Lanham Act.  
When a plaintiff is required to show that the defendant’s conduct was 
intentional and willful, this results in an obvious hardship on trademark 
owners and tilts the scales in favor of infringers.229 Yet because “Congress 
desired to make trademark infringement unprofitable,” the Lanham Act was 
designed to be “a pro-trademark owner piece of legislation.”230 Given the 
Lanham Act’s purpose of offering support to trademark owners, to raise the 
burden of proof to clear and convincing evidence would be in direct 
opposition to the goals of Congress. 
Further, a plaintiff who has satisfied his burden of proof with respect to 
the defendant’s intent under a preponderance standard essentially has 
presented sufficient evidence that it is more likely than not that the 
defendant was purposefully trying to create confusion among consumers.231 
Proof by preponderance means “[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not 
necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a 
fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force.”232 By using this 
standard, there will be convincing force of exactly what Congress was 
trying to prevent in enacting the Lanham Act. Therefore, requiring 
convincing force is sufficient to establish the defendant’s intent.  
2. Recognizing the Importance of Circumstantial Evidence 
Additionally, a plaintiff will almost always have to prove intent under 
the Act through circumstantial evidence; direct evidence is rarely 
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available.233 It was this exact difficulty that resulted in a major change 
between the Trade-Mark Act of 1920 and the Lanham Act: the omission of 
the former’s requirement of “willfulness or intent to deceive.”234 Removal 
of this requirement demonstrates that Congress tried to make it easier, not 
more difficult, for a plaintiff to succeed in a claim for trademark 
infringement or unfair competition. However, case law has made it evident 
that proof of this intent weighs heavily in satisfying the “likelihood of 
confusion” test, even though proving the defendant’s intent is no longer an 
absolute necessity in these Lanham Act claims.235  
When turning to proof of the defendant’s intent through the use of 
circumstantial evidence, “the actions of [the] defendant speak louder than 
his words denying any intent to deceive people.”236 Thus, common patterns 
of a defendant’s conduct instigated some courts to infer wrongful intent and 
require a credible explanation. For instance, when a defendant was aware of 
the plaintiff’s existing mark and just happened to choose a mark that was 
strikingly similar when he had the freedom of choice for his mark, some 
courts may assume a defendant intended to confuse consumers.237 In the 
majority of cases, however, the plaintiff will have to prove more than the 
defendant’s mere knowledge of the plaintiff’s existing mark, such as the 
defendant’s continued use of the mark after rejection from registration.238  
Other circumstantial factors that have played a role in the courts’ 
willfulness inquiry include “whether the defendant conducted a trademark 
search,” sought and relied on recommendations from counsel, or included 
elements in his own mark to avoid confusion.239 
In its evaluation regarding circumstantial evidence, a federal district 
court in E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida International, Inc., 
found pertinent that there was little distinction between the plaintiff’s and 
the defendant’s marks, that the plaintiff’s mark was well known and the 
defendant was fully aware of the mark, and that there was no reasonable 
explanation given as to why the defendant chose such a similar mark.240  
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Although Congress saw the difficulty in proving intent and therefore 
removed this requisite when enacting the Lanham Act, this element has 
nonetheless managed to creep back into the law. With the removal of this 
requirement, it can easily be inferred that Congress would not want to make 
it even more difficult for the plaintiff to succeed in a Lanham Act claim. 
This strongly supports usage of the lower preponderance of the evidence 
standard. 
Establishing a defendant’s intent to confuse is inevitably going to be 
conducted by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Because the 
plaintiff possesses the burden of proving intent to confuse, she is required 
to present multiple suspicious facts and actions on behalf of the defendant 
to give rise to the inference of intent to confuse. Therefore, this inherent 
difficulty in showing the infringer’s state of mind by looking to 
circumstantial evidence strongly supports using the lower burden of 
preponderance of the evidence.241  
3. Moral Justifications 
Although the moral argument alone typically cannot justify the adoption 
of legal rules, morality is still relevant and comes into play in many areas of 
the law.242 The moral norm against deception and deliberate lying is one 
very familiar in our society and can be applied in support of trademark 
protection.243  
When a defendant purposefully deceives and confuses purchasers as to 
the source of the product, she is committing a moral wrong against both the 
trademark owner and consumers as a whole. Not only does deception afflict 
consumers, it also “diverts trade from honest competitors.”244 Therefore, 
when a claimant presents evidence indicating that the defendant possessed 
intent to confuse consumers, this norm supports the use of the 
preponderance of the evidence burden because use of the clear and 
convincing evidence standard would again be aiding the wrongdoer, a 
precise contradiction to the moral norm itself.  
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Another moral norm to consider in this context stems from John Locke’s 
labor theory that “one deserves to own the fruits of one’s labor.”245 The 
trademark owner has invested time and capital into developing the goodwill 
of his trademark; thus, under the Lockean theory, that owner is the one who 
deserves to reap the full benefits of his labor.246 Applying this theory to the 
burden of proof argument, a heightened burden of proof when evaluating 
the defendant’s intent makes it more difficult for the trademark owner to 
enjoy fully the economic benefits resulting from their mark, and therefore 
the preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate.  
In sum, congressional intent to enact pro-trademark legislation, the 
innate difficulties in proving an opposing party’s intent resulting in the 
frequent need to look at circumstantial evidence, and the immorality of 
intending to confuse all strongly support the use of preponderance of the 
evidence as the standard for intentional violations under the Lanham Act.247 
V. Conclusion 
As trademark law has evolved, the purposes behind federal trademark 
law itself remain clear: to protect trademark owners’ rights to the value and 
goodwill they have established and to protect purchasers’ ability to 
distinguish between products. Though the Lanham Act of 1946 and the 
amendments thereto have provided a much-needed safeguard for the 
owners of these marks, many aspects of these claims still remain unsettled.  
Oftentimes, a trademark owner brings suit against a dishonest defendant, 
one who has infringed on the owner’s mark with the intent to confuse 
consumers. Although the Lanham Act explicitly mentioned these types of 
intentional infringements, the language did not specify the proper burden of 
proof the plaintiff had to meet with respect to intent. This has caused a 
division among the circuits, with some courts using the preponderance of 
the evidence standard and others applying the clear and convincing 
evidence standard. However, analysis of the arguments supporting both 
standards, as well as an inquiry into public policy and the goals of the Act 
itself, reaffirm that the preponderance of the evidence standard is the best. 
It is important to remember that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is the default setting for civil litigation between private parties—a 
setting that the Supreme Court itself has been reluctant to raise unless 
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particularly important personal rights are involved. Economic loss in the 
field of competition simply is not a right that warrants this heightened 
burden.  
Secondly, the common law justifications for using a heightened burden 
in cases dealing with fraudulent conduct are inapplicable in the Lanham Act 
context. The fear of falsely contrived cases is virtually nonexistent when 
federal statutes with clearly defined elements are put into place. 
Furthermore, though the clear and convincing standard may be appropriate 
in the patent infringement context, that standard should not be 
automatically imported merely because both involve intellectual property. 
The two areas of law serve different purposes—one seeks to protect 
innovation and creativity, the other looks to foster security in origin and 
goodwill in a product. And both areas deserve their own justification for 
raising the burden of proof above the default setting. 
Most importantly, the goals behind the Lanham Act and public policy 
itself all beckon for the preponderance standard. A trademark owner 
seeking compensation due to a defendant infringing upon his mark should 
not face a higher hurdle than other commercial claimants. Not only will the 
plaintiff often have to rely on circumstantial evidence to prove intent, but 
moral justifications strongly support use of the preponderance standard.  
In the ever-changing commerce of our nation, the Lanham Act has 
provided protection to those willing to innovate and contribute intellectual 
capital. In all civil contexts, we should require justification for ratcheting 
the burden of proof over the default setting. With the Lanham Act in 
particular, we must ensure that the burden of proof is reasonably attainable 
for injured parties. And to stay true to the purposes of the Lanham Act, the 
answer lies in the preponderance of the evidence. 
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